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Socialism as a Life-Coherent Society
Jeff Noonan1
All varieties of socialism share this trait in common: they are systematic alternatives to capitalism. But why should a systematic alternative
to capitalism be necessary? Has it not proven to be the most productive economic system in history? Has it not created social conditions in
which the powers of human imagination, creativity, and scientific understanding have grown to wider scope than in any previous society? Has
it not enabled human beings to extend their life span and live healthier
and more active lives than ever before? Has it not proven extraordinarily
plastic, able to solve unforeseen problems in ways that its opponents
continue to predict that it cannot, thus proving itself superior to any proposed alternative? These are difficult questions that anyone who claims
that an alternative is necessary must take seriously.
There is little use in denying that one part of honest answers to the
foregoing questions is “yes.” No system has proven as productive, has
enabled the development of imagination, creativity, and science to as
wide a compass, cured more diseases, or proven as adaptable and protean as capitalism. However, since capitalism is not on trial here, but
under analysis, more than yes or no answers are permitted. When more
complex answers to the questions are proffered, the grounds supporting
the need for a systematic alternative which builds upon the real achievements of capitalism become clear.
Notwithstanding those real achievements, an alternative is ultimately necessary because the social processes through which capitalism
reproduces and develops itself are ecologically unsustainable and
socially, politically, and culturally contradictory. At
the root of capitalism’s unsustainable and contradictory nature is its
ruling money-value system. The money-value system reduces the good
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across all dimensions of human life-activity to increasing the moneyvalue available for appropriation by private market agents, rendering
the system blind to any harms that it imposes on natural life-support and
social life-development systems which are not measurable in moneyvalue terms. Beneath the apparent freedom of interest and activity
enabled by capitalism lies a structure of social dependence upon possession of money-value for the satisfaction of life’s requirements.
Peering into this structure of dependence discloses the secret of capitalist unsustainability and contradiction: it systematically confuses life-value
with money-value. Life-value is that which is instrumentally or intrinsically
good for living things. All life-requirement satisfiers, i.e., those resources,
institutions, relationships, and practices that enable life to survive, reproduce, and develop, have instrumental life-value (McMurtry, 1998, 164). The
experiences and activities which living things are able to have and realise
because life-requirements are satisfied are, in general, intrinsically lifevaluable, the substance of the good life. Capitalism does indeed produce
instrumental life-value and enable the expression of intrinsic life-value, but
in systematically life-incoherent ways. Rather than “consistently enabling
ecological and human life together,” as a life-coherent society would, capitalism systematically degrades and depletes natural life-support systems at
an accelerating pace, deprives those without the money to pay of the means
of satisfying their natural and socio-cultural life-requirements, selects for
expression and enjoyment only those experiences and activities which are
money-valuable, and subjects even those experiences and activities to competitive zero sum games which ensures that the good of some people’s lives
is sacrificed for the sake of the good of other people’s lives (McMurtry, 2011,
4). A socialist alternative to capitalism is necessary because capitalism generates life-crises in the natural and socio-cultural dimensions of life-support
and life-development. The warrant and value of this alternative is determined by the extent to which socialism proves capable of solving capitalist
life-crises in life-coherent ways. As will become clear, conceiving socialism
as a life-coherent society requires important revisions to prevailing interpretations of its traditional justificatory values.
Capitalist Life-Incoherence and Traditional Socialist Values
There is a large and growing body of socialist literature that focuses
on the long-term unsustainability of capitalist society. The main conclusion of this literature is that capitalism is materially irrational because
the expansion of money-value it demands contracts the natural system
of life-support upon which its existence as a social system depends. As
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Meszaros argues, “The system is and must remain expansion oriented and
driven by accumulation. Naturally, what is at issue in this regard is not
a process designed for ensuring the satisfaction of human need. Rather,
it is the expansion of capital as an end in itself, serving the preservation
of a system which could not survive without consistently asserting its
power as an extended mode of reproduction” (Meszaros, 2008, 65). This
system-need to expand money-capital is the driver of capitalist life-incoherence. The good of the system, ever expanding production of moneycapital, undermines, over the long term, the natural life-support system
upon which the system itself depends. As Kovel argues, “the [capitalist]
imperative to expand continually erodes the edges of ecologies along
an ever expanding perimeter, overwhelming or displacing recuperative
efforts, and accelerating a cascade of destabilization” (Kovel, 2007, p. 51,
see also Meszaros, 2008, p. 99-100, Kovel and Lowy, 2011). It is no good
to rejoin to worries about long-term consequences that in the long term
we are all dead, as Keynes said, so that only short and medium term
thinking in economics makes sense (Keynes, 1924, p. 88). The rejoinder
commits a fallacy of composition. It is true that every human individual
exists for a fixed period of time, but it does not follow that the species
faces the same limits. The species can reproduce itself indefinitely into
the future. To the extent that economics focuses on the life of individuals
as moments of the open-ended life of the species, long term, life-coherent
thinking is required.
However, the problem of life-incoherence has not always been
recognised in the history of socialist thought. As Lebowitz has recently
noted, the history of socialism is riven by a tension between productvist
and humanist interpretations. “Rather than ... focus upon the full development of human potential, ... the dominant conception of socialism in
the twentieth century tended to stress the development of the productive forces ... An important part of the socialist vision was lost—human
beings at the centre” (Lebowitz, 2010, 21). This tension was not invented
by twentieth century socialists. It can be found in Marx himself who
understood the necessity of socialism as arising not from the long-term
life-incoherence of capitalist productivity, but from the systematic
blockage that capitalist relations of production imposed upon the ability
of the productive forces to expand (Marx, 1970, 21, Marx and Engels,
1975, 54-58). While it is true, as John Bellamy Foster has demonstrated,
that Marx did not ignore the natural foundations of human life but in
fact understood labour as humanity’s metabolism with nature and criticised capitalism for imposing a “metabolic rift” between human beings
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and their natural life-support system, it remains true that Marx understood an essential element of socialism to be the unlocking of productive
potential suppressed by capitalism (Bellamy Foster, 2000, p. 141-177).
While the historical context in which Marx wrote explains his belief that
productive force expansion and socialism were essentially connected,
in our changed circumstances the opposite relationship is demanded:
socialism as a life-coherent society must end the hypertrophied growth
of productive forces.
If today the viability of the socialist project depends upon rejecting
the traditional belief that socialism will be a society of unbounded
productivity in favour of the suppressed alternative, socialism as a
society with human needs and human capacities at the centre, we
must ask in what human needs consist and to what extent and in
what directions it is good to develop human capacities. If we start, as
materialists must, from the natural basis of human life, then human
needs originate in those non-optional physical-organic life-requirements without which biological life is impossible. So much is clear
from Marx in The German Ideology (Marx, 1975, p 37). But when
we venture beyond the physical-organic bases of life the history of
socialist thought loses sight of the essential connection between needs
and the range of objective requirements of human life. Despite Marx’s
understanding of real wealth as lying in human needs and capacities, he nowhere provides a criterion to distinguish between social
needs which are not directly organic and consumer demands, and
in some cases directly conflates needs and consumer demands. The
most egregious example of this failure to rigorously distinguish real
needs (objective natural and social life-requirements) from consumer
demands occurs in Wage Labour and Capital, where Marx argues that
a house which meets a person’s material need for shelter is enjoyed
as such, so long as no one builds a bigger house next door. As soon as
that happens, the owner of the smaller house now feels that his modest
dwelling shows that “he has only very slight or no demands to make”
(Marx, 1973, p. 163). Yet, this belief that one’s happiness as a human
being depends upon ever higher levels of consumption, as opposed
to the sufficient satisfaction of one’s real life-requirements, is just the
psychology of consumer desire exploited by capitalist advertisers. As
I have argued in more detail elsewhere, Marx’s failure to define needs
as real life-requirements blinds him to the life-destructive implications of the equation of happiness with rising levels of consumption
(Noonan, 2006, p. 121-130).
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For the most part this elision has not been challenged by subsequent
Marxists. Neither Agnes Heller nor Ian Fraser, who have provided the
most detailed studies of Marx’s conception of human needs, exposed
this conflation of needs and consumer demands (Heller, 1976; Fraser,
1998). Alan Gilbert, who grounds his Marxist theory of moral realism in
human needs, likewise provides no explicit criterion by which objective
human life-requirements can be rigorously distinguished from stimulated consumer demands (Gilbert, 1982; Gilbert, 1986). In the midst of
ecological crisis today, this conceptual lacuna can no longer be accepted,
as the failure to limit needs to what is universally required by human
life to survive and socially develop impedes the formulation of a lifecoherent conception of socialism.
Sympathetic critics of my position might point to the work of Marcuse or, more recently, the work of eco-socialists like Joel Kovel as having
already filled in this lacuna. It is true that Marcuse’s conception of “true”
and “false” needs in One Dimensional Man implies that the differentia
specifica of true needs is that they are objective life-requirements, but
he does not state this criterion explicitly and he provides no systematic
account of the limits of our needs (Marcuse, 1964, p. 4-5). This failure to
distinguish needs as life-requirements from consumer demands persists
in the thought even of those socialists who have gone the furthest towards
making the implicit life-coherence of the socialist alternative explicit.
Thus Kovel contrasts the capitalist prioritisation of exchange value to
the socialist alternative of prioritization of use-value, without noting the
obvious, that there are life-destructive use-values that socialism ought
not waste resources producing (Kovel, 2007, p. 39). Kovel does, it is true,
argue that a socialist economy ought to produce only those use-values
that satisfy human needs, but provides no criterion by which to distinguish need and consumer demand, and at one point conflates needs with
advertising-induced addictions. “As capitalism penetrates life-worlds, it
alters them in ways that foster its accumulation, chiefly by introducing
a sense of dissatisfaction or lack...In this way, children develop such a
craving for caffeine-laced sugar-loaded, or artificially sweetened soft
drinks that it may be said that they positively need them” (Kovel, 2007,
p. 53). If one defines needs as life-requirements, then it can never be the
case that our addictions are needs. Life-requirements are not simply
demands for use-values that we lack, they are our actual, positive connection to the natural field of life-support and the social field of lifedevelopment. As such they are our essential guide to the fundamentally
practical question of what a life-coherent socialism must produce. If we
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allow that consumer addictions are needs, then we use need in a purely
descriptive sense, which then undermines the normative force of the difference between a life-requirement and consumer-demand.
An analogous problem applies to the human potential or human
capacities that socialism is supposed to better enable. Lebowitz’
s most recent defence of socialism contends that “real wealth is
the development of human capacities, the development of human
potential.”(Lebowitz, 2010, p. 43). Stated in this unqualified way this
position has no answer to the objection that capitalism has developed
human potential and capacities better than any alternative, because
it again lacks a criterion by which to distinguish life-valuable and
life-disvaluable capacities and potentials. Surely the capacities of
human beings to instrumentally exploit nature have been developed
under capitalism, and the potential to invent destructive weapons
has been realized to an exquisite degree. Are these the potentials and
the capacities that Lebowitz thinks socialism ought to better develop?
Clearly not. But when we ask “why not? we do not find the conceptual grounds for a principled answer, even though that answer is vital
to explaining and defending the socialist alternative that Lebowitiz
is attempting to construct. The conceptual basis of that principled
answer lies in the idea of life-value, to a more nuanced explanation of
which I now turn.
Socialism, Life-Value, and Life-Coherence	
I noted in the introduction that life-values are either instrumental or
intrinsic. Instrumental life-values are defined by the range of life-requirements that a given organism must satisfy if it is to survive, develop, and
express its vital capacities. Human beings share with all other life-forms
physical-organic requirements of survival, but our much richer cognitive, imaginative, and practical-creative capacities entail socio-cultural
and temporal requirements for which we know of no real analogues in
the rest of nature. The free expression and enjoyment of our capacities for
social self-consciousness and intentional agency require definite forms of
loving and caring interpersonal relationships, education, cultural spaces
and institutions in which creative self and collective expression can be
developed and enjoyed, political institutions in which collective rules
of social life can be decided, opportunities for meaningful creation and
contribution through productive work, and time experienced as an open
matrix of possibilities for action. Thus human beings share three sets of
life-requirements corresponding to the three dimensions of human life:
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physical-organic requirements of biological life, socio-cultural requirements of human life as a socially self-conscious agent, and temporal
requirements of free human life.
In all three cases we can apply a test to distinguish between resources,
practices, relationships, and institutional structures which have instrumental life-value, and are therefore objective life-requirements, or needs,
and consumer demands and preferences which may be desired, but are
not life-requirements, and are therefore either of no life-value or negative
life-value (life-destructive). In order to distinguish between life-requirements and consumer demands we must ask: if anyone were deprived
of the given resource, relationship, practice, or institutional structure,
would they suffer harm to any of their human capacities to experience
the world through the senses, to feel the range of human emotions, to
think and imagine, or act and create in life-valuable ways (McMurtry,
2008, p. 164)? If deprivation causes objective harm in the form of loss
of life or vital capacity, such as would ensue if one were deprived of all
shelter in a cold climate, then the object, relationship, practice or institutional structure in question is a requirement of organic-social human
life. If only subjective feelings of relative deprivation ensue, as in the case
of Marx’s man jealous of his neighbour’s house, then no life-requirement
is involved, but only a consumer demand with no or negative life-value.
Let me give one example from each class of life-requirements to clarify
my meaning.
All of our sentient, cognitive, and imaginative capacities depend
upon the functioning of our brains. Without adequate protein, brain
function is degraded, and thus so too the capacities to sense, think, and
imagine. There is an objective relationship between protein intake and
brain function such that objective harm in the form of degradation of
the various capacities of the brain necessarily follows deprivation. It
does not follow that there is only one way to satisfy this life-requirement
for protein; the life requirement is not for any particular form of food
but for any food that will satisfy the brain’s requirement for protein.
Analogous forms of harm are caused by the deprivation of socio-cultural
life-requirements, although here the harm is not to the organic systems
themselves but to the human forms of experience, thought, and activity
they enable. Adequately functioning eyes and brains can perfectly well
sense the world, but it does not follow that they will see all that there
is to experience. Unless the person to whom the eyes and brain belong
receives some degree of education and cultivation, it is quite possible
for the person not to see the natural and humanly created beauty of the
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world. As Marx says, “the care burdened man in need has no sense for the
finest play.”(Marx, 1975a, p. 302). The human form of capacity expression emerges out of the biological organization of the human body, but
is not reducible to it. Well-functioning biological machines may be sociopathically indifferent to the others’ pain which they observe. Healthy
people may be illiterate, or live in social circumstances that prevent them
from participating in political life, or be forced into mindless drudgery
as their life’s work. In cases such as these there is no impairment of
biological functioning but there certainly is harm to the human form of
expression of our sentient, cognitive, imaginative, and creative capacities. I admit that verbal scepticism about socio-cultural life-requirements
s possible, but that it would only prove practically convincing were
the sceptic willing to deprive him or herself permanently of that which
he or she claims is not a real life-requirement: loving and caring concern between people, education, political participation, intrinsically and
instrumentally life-valuable and democratically governed work, and the
experience of all natural and humanly created beauty. Deprivation of
the third class of life-requirement, the requirement of mortal beings for
the experience of time as free, also causes objective harm, this time to
our ability to express our life-capacities freely. By the expression “the
experience of time as free” I do not mean the availability of “empty
time,” time in which no external force compels us to do one thing rather
than another (Noonan, 2009, p. 377-393). Some degree of empty time is
a material condition of the experience of time as free, but the latter is
not reducible to empty time. Rather, it is essentially an experience of
time as an open matrix of possibilities for life-valuable activity, in contrast to unfree time, the experience of time as an inescapable, externally
imposed routine. As the human form of capacity expression develops
out of our biological organism, so too their free realization grows out
of their human form. Freedom requires in addition to the satisfaction of
biological and socio-cultural life-requirements some degree of free time
in which the person can contemplate different possibilities for capacity
expression and development and decide between them. There is thus a
difference between a life rich in content of human capacity expression
and a life in which this content is developed freely. Someone trapped
in the “rat race” of capitalism may express complex and challenging
capacities in a particularly human way at work and yet feel oppressed
rather than free. If money-value pressures cause these capacities to be
expressed in routinized ways, then the capacities are not freely developed but coerced by the structure of work in which the person is trapped.
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Since human beings have only a finite life-span, they are harmed to the
extent that their life-time is structured as a closed routine rather than
an open matrix of possibilities for life-valuable activity. Again, sceptical
rejoinders are possible, but presuppose exactly what they deny. No one
without the time to freely mull over the structure and implications of
philosophical arguments makes sceptical rejoinders. Hence I conclude
that these three-dimensions of human life-requirement are objectively
real, the material foundation of any humanly possible good life, and that
anyone is harmed to the extent that they are deprived of one or more of
them.
Capitalism is systematically harmful to people because: it degrades
the natural field of life-support upon which our biological organism
depends and makes the satisfaction of natural, socio-cultural, and temporal life-requirements contingent on their serving the master capitalist
goal of money-value accumulation. In thus making life-requirement satisfaction contingent on the ability to pay, capitalism treats life-requirements as instruments for the expansion of money-value rather than
instruments of the creation of intrinsic life-value. It thus reduces social
institutions to structures of exploitation rather than life-requirement satisfaction and free life-capacity realization. Finally, capitalism reifies time
such that it is experienced as an oppressive structure in which human
activity is systematically routinized in the service of external powers. If
socialism is the solution for these harms then it must solve these problems in a life-coherent manner. What would such a solution entail?
As I noted in the introductory comments, life-coherence requires
enabling ecological and human life together. It might seem that the
simultaneous satisfaction of these twin demands is impossible, that the
good life for humans requires more and more things, such that human
life can only be enabled if ecological life is damaged. In fact, the accumulation of things beyond life-requirements does not make life any better,
because life is essentially creative activity, and most consumer goods are
passivity-inducing, which is why shopping for them tends to be more
enjoyable than possessing them (Kasser, 2002, p. 85-86). Thin a social
activity it may be, but shopping is nevertheless a social activity. Once
the new gadget has been brought home, boredom with it soon ensues.
The life-requirements set out above are the natural, social, and temporal
conditions for the widest possible life-coherent expression of human
capacities. Since their satisfaction can be achieved without much of
what advertisers tell us are necessities but which in reality have no committed life-function in any dimension of being humanly alive, socialist
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production can enable human and ecological life together by progressively reducing the energy and resources devoted to the production of
life-disvaluable commodities. As it is the wealthy societies of the Global
North that waste the most energy and resources in the consumption of
commodities which contribute nothing to life-maintenance, development, or enjoyment, the shift in priorities of production would, while
reducing the overall ecological impact of human economies, make more
resources available for life-development of the Global South, and still
enable more active and enjoyable lives in the global North. In this way,
socialism as a life-coherent society can enable human and ecological life
together by limiting the output of production to that which is required
by our organism and to fund the institutions, relationships and free time
required to freely cultivate our capacities.
To put this point another way, minimizing the energy and resources
it takes to produce instrumental life-value is the condition for the maximization of intrinsic life-value over the open-ended future of the human
species. Intrinsic life-value, recall, is the enjoyed, life-coherent expression of freely realized life-capacities. Capitalism is life incoherent in
relation to the expression and enjoyment of human capacities because
its ruling value system does not valorise the universal and comprehensive satisfaction of life-requirements. Thus the lives of most people are
dependent upon finding paid work, which in turn is not organized so
as to enable the comprehensive expression and enjoyment of the fullrange of life-capacities, but to maximise profits for the firm which purchases the labour-power through which the capacities are expressed.
Life-capacities may be developed, but not as intrinsic life-values, but as
exploitable inputs to the production of money-value. Even where human
capacities are developed in rich and complex ways, the ends they serve
are often life-destructive. And even where the ends they serve are not
life-destructive, the distribution of positions is not according to talent
and aptitude, but limited by the demands of profitability, which means
that people who are willing and able to contribute their talents and aptitudes to life-valuable social tasks cannot find work.
Traditionally, socialism has encapsulated its solution to these structural impediments to the free expression and enjoyment of capacities in
slogans like “from
each according to their abilities, to each according their needs”
(Marx, 1978, p. 531). But just as in the case of needs, which have not
been consistently and coherently defined in terms of the three classes of
life-requirements, so too has the question of the limits of life-valuable
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capacity development been left unaddressed. Instead of systematic
interrogation of these limits we too often find socialism identified with
the transcendence of all limits. Lebowitz quotes Marx with approval
for his claim that socialism will develop “all human powers as such as
ends in themselves,” without noting the obvious problem, all too clear
from the history of capitalist industry, that the set of all human powers
includes life-destructive powers. Clearly Marx and Lebowitz do not
mean to affirm the power to destroy, but by not tying down the human
powers whose development they affirm to the required life-coherence
limitation, they open themselves to objections of this sort. Such critiques
are not only abstract philosophical objections but also political, as in
environmentalist critiques of socialism as ecologically destructive or
radical feminist critiques of Marxism as still rooted in masculinist psychologies of violence and conquest.(Benton, 1989, p. 51-86; Wittig, 1997,
p. 224-225).
To obviate these objections and to build political links to those who
lodge them it must be made clear the ways in which the principle of
life-coherence would govern the development of human capacities in a
future socialist society. Just as it is not the case that every use-value has
instrumental life-value, so too not every expression of human capacities
has intrinsic life-value. Absolute intrinsic life-value attaches only to the
raw capacities to sense, feel, think, imagine, and act. Definite constellations of these raw capacities in concrete expressions are subject to evaluation according to the principle of life-coherence. This principle rules out
forms of capacity expression which: (1) permanently degrade the natural
life-support system or destroy non-human life for no higher, long-term
life-serving purpose; and (2) depend necessarily on the exploitation
of others’ life-requirements, such that the exploited other is prevented
from expressing and enjoying his or her life-capacities as a necessary
consequence of the structure of exploitation within which he or she lives.
The normal expression of life-capacities under capitalism violates
both of these limitations. The extent of their development is limited
not by the principle of life-coherence but by the degree to which the
development of any given capacity is money-valuable. Even where ecodestruction is avoided, the development and expression of life-capacities
cannot escape the structures of exploitative work and oppressive sociocultural institutions and ideologies that dominate life in activity in capitalist society. The life-coherent solution to these systematic problems is
to create the social conditions in which human capacities are expressed
and enjoyed only in those forms that enable ecological and human life
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together. If that which is intrinsically valuable in its effects destroys
the natural and social life-support and life-development systems upon
which its very existence depends, then this conception of intrinsic value
must be materially irrational. If socialism is to solve the problems of
capitalism and secure the comprehensive conditions for everyone to
enjoy their lives through making valuable contributions to the natural
and social worlds, it must take care to specify clearly the limits that lifesupport systems and the shared life-interests of other people impose on
individual goals and projects. Analogous limits must govern the forms
of political struggle through which socialism can be progressively built.
To an explanation and defence of a life-coherent political practice I now
turn in conclusion.
Life-Coherence and Political Practice
As Lebowitz rightly argues, new societies do not “drop from the
sky” or emerge “pristine and complete from the conceptions of intellectuals,” but rather “emerge within and in opposition to the existing
society” (Lebowitz, 2006, p. 62). His point, as I interpret it, is that the task
of building socialism is not like constructing a new building from blueprints, but like an on-going project of renovating an existing building
piece by piece until a different building sits on the same foundations.
As he argues in relation to the emergence in Venezuela of new neighbourhood-based democratic councils and workers’ co-management of
enterprises, “the emergence of both these new elements is a process—a
process of learning and a process of development.”(Lebowitz, 2006, p.
112). They are elements of a socialist alternative developing within an
existing capitalist society. Building socialism is thus not a process that
awaits a revolutionary break with capitalism but is itself that break
which emerges within and in tension and struggle with the prevailing
capitalist institutions. Some socialists might vociferously object to the
implications of the metaphor by noting that it claims that a new society
can be built upon on the same foundations as the old. The objection can
be met by pointing out that all societies have the same material foundations: the natural life-support system and human labour as “metabolic
interchange” with it. Nevertheless, it is true that the metaphor is meant
to emphasise more than is usual the continuities that link present capitalist society to a future socialist society. Socialists have paid most attention, for obvious reasons, to questions about how best to bring about
fundamental social transformation: can it be achieved through reforms,
or is revolution necessary? If revolution is necessary, what does revolu-
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tion mean? Can it be the spontaneous product of workers’ self-activity,
or does it require a vanguard party? What ought the relationship be
between workers and the party, or between workers as a class and other
oppressed groups whose members belong to different classes? These
questions define in large part the political history of different socialist
movements, and I will have something to say, in general, about them at
the end. To begin, however, I want to say something about what would
remain continuous between socialist and capitalist society, not for the
sake of novelty, but because I think that the principle of life-coherence
sheds light on this under-examined issue in a way that has important
practical implications for rebuilding a democratic socialist movement.
Capitalism is able to reproduce itself in the short and medium term
despite the manifold economic, political, social, and environmental
crises it regularly generates because people believe themselves to be
ultimately dependent upon access to its labour and commodity markets
for their survival and development. Although the ultimate foundations
of human life are not markets and commodities, but natural resources
and human labour, this belief is not completely mistaken. It is supported
by the fact that in capitalist social reality money is required to exchange
for the commodities that one’s life and development requires. So long as
the belief persists that capitalist labour and commodity markets are the
ultimate foundations of life and development it will appear to all who
hold this belief that any attack on the existing society is an attack on the
very foundations of life and life-development.
By this claim I do not mean that people never fight back unless they
believe that a completely different world is possible, but rather that they
fight back in self-limiting ways because they cannot see any real possibility for successfully building a fundamentally different society. To
take a recent case as illustration of the meaning of my claim, in June
2011 postal workers went on strike against Canada Post. Fearing back to
work legislation, they decided to engage in rotating strikes rather than
an all-out nation-wide strike. In response, Canada Post locked them
out and the Conservative government then passed back to work legislation. Yet, the strategy, though it ultimately proved self-undermining,
is understandable, not simply as conservatism on the part of the union
leadership, but as rooted in genuine fear of the consequences of all-out
challenges to capitalist power in an era where a systematic alternative
seems remote. As Albo, Gindin, and Panitch argue, capitalism has consistently “compelled workers to become more dependent on the market
as individuals so as to limit their ability to contest the social relations
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of the capitalist market as a class” (Albo, Gindin, and Pantich, 2010, p.
90). From the standpoint of anyone enmeshed in the daily struggle to
make money in order to survive, talk of total social transformation does
not sound utopian, but suicidal. Hence oppositional politics, especially
in wealthy societies, remains limited to promises of piecemeal reform
that do not upset “the markets” for fear of compromising money-value
growth upon which life and life-development appear to depend. Systemic causes are never addressed, and society lurches from one crisis to
the next.
This fear cannot be overcome by talk of “smashing” and “destroying”
capitalism that sometimes tempt socialists because people for the most
part do not believe that it can be smashed or destroyed. In order to build
movements broad-based and powerful enough to solve the causes of
life-crises, socialists might do better to emphasise the natural and institutional continuity between capitalism and socialism. By ‘natural and
institutional continuity’ I refer to the natural system of life-support
that underlies any human society and supplies all the physical-organic
requirements of life, and existing social institutions, relationships, and
practices in so far as they actually fulfill their life-coherent function:
enabling the development of human capacities through the satisfaction
of life-requirements. The point of emphasising natural and institutional
continuity is not to attenuate the essential opposition between capitalism
and socialism, but rather to bring to light the longer and deeper history
of collective labour and struggle through which social institutions have
been built up from their natural bases and progressively turned from support of the particular interests of ruling classes towards universal provision of life-requirements across the three dimensions of human life. If we
ground the struggle for socialism in those aspects of existing institutions
which actually serve the shared life-interest, stressing always the role
that struggle has played historically in extending this life-service, then
the task of building socialism no longer appears as a suicidal destruction
of existing means of life-support, but an organic development beyond
the achieved plateaus of life-requirement satisfaction found in actually
existing civil commons institutions and practices.
The civil commons is McMurtry’s term for all non-commodified
social goods which enable human life to freely develop (McMurtry, 2002,
p. 117). These institutions and practices range from languages and love
for children through to free education, health care, and the democratic
principle that all who are subject to institutions ought to play an active
role in their governance. The universality of life-requirement provision
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that defines the civil commons contrast with privacy of monetary benefit
that defines the system-value that governs institutions today. All social
institutions are marked by this contradiction. People love their children,
but often express this love by buying them things which they in no sense
require and which contribute to inculcating the habitual equation of
enjoyment with the purchase of commodities. Publically funded health
care in Canada is a civil commons institution, but it is continually eroded
at the margins by the commodified medical industry. Education is a
public civil commons good, but at the post-secondary level it is becoming
increasingly commodified and bent to the purposes of private industry.
Existing political institutions are formally democratic, but determined
by the master purpose of protecting the existing structure of power and
ruling value system, and thus not coherently anchored in protection and
satisfaction of the shared life-interest.
My contention is that socialism indeed does not drop from the
sky but finds its organic basis in the achieved level of civil commons
development. Motivating people in the struggle for socialism is thus
not a task, which even socialists sometimes present it as being, of winning people to an alien ideology, but disclosing how socialist values are
already embodied in the civil commons function of existing institutions
which people already support, and whose erosion they lament, if not
always actively resist. The politically relevant contradiction, the one
that socialists ought to focus people’s attention on, is between the goodness of the civil commons function of these institutions, and the ways
in which this actually existing goodness is negated to the extent that
private money-value interests seize control. Let me illustrate my claim
through the paradigmatic example of Canadian public health care.
The principle if not the complete practice of public medicine in
Canada is “to each according to her or his need.” People might debate
the cogency of this principle in the abstract, but as concretely applied
to medical care, the majority of Canadians consistently defend it. More
importantly, by any metric one cares to choose: cost effectiveness, health
outcomes, or equity of access it is demonstrably superior to commodified medicine (Armstrong, Armstrong, Bourgeault, Choniere, Lexchin,
Mykhalovsky, Peters, and White, 2004, p. 13-38). Thus public medical care is a real life, if partial and imperfect, realization of the socialist
principle of distribution. When it is attacked, people mobilise to defend
it. What they defend it from is the core distributive principle of capitalism: to each according to his or her ability to pay, regardless of his or
her own or others’ need. Yet, proponents of public medical care rarely
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equate it with the demonstrably superior outcomes of the socialist principle of distribution that underlies it. “Socialism” is most often only
mentioned by opponents who castigate it as such. Defenders typically
bend over backwards trying to distance their defence of public medical
care from socialism, and Marxists too often treat it as nothing more than
a “reform” within capitalism. But this response misses a crucial opportunity to link socialism with a practice that enjoys majority support and
actually works.
Of course it is true that a means of health care delivery is not a whole
society. My point is not to claim that advanced capitalism is implicitly
socialist. Nor I am not arguing that the path towards socialism can be
advanced by what Erik Olin Wright calls “symbiotic” forms of social
transformation (Wright, 2010, p. 337-365). Symbiotic forms of
social transformation are processes of social change which achieve
real reform for workers and other subordinate groups while at the same
time solve certain problems for capitalists. Universal suffrage is an
example: it solved the problem of containing radical opposition to capitalism while also enabling workers to gain and use political power to
advance certain other economic goals. Although real reform is possible
through such strategies, fundamental social change is not. Eventually
the logic of the existing system is going to put a stop to the evolving
counter-logic of the alternative.
My point is thus not that radical change can be achieved by progressive reforms extended over an open ended time frame, but rather
that past social struggles have created civil commons institutions which
demonstrably function according to socialist principles. This point can
become the centre of political education for mass mobilization– another
world is possible because elements of it are actual, and have been made so
through successful struggles. The fact that these institutions work better
than market alternatives provides an organic basis for socialist politics.
By “organic” I mean actually existing and functioning in the present as
means of life-requirement satisfaction. Organic is to be contrasted with
“theoretical,” i.e., abstract arguments that claim to prove that a systematic socialist alternative to capitalism is possible, but whose plausibility
depends entirely upon the internal logical cogency of argument. In
other words, the term is meant to stress that the struggle for socialism
occurs along an historical continuum of building up civil commons
institutions whose real value is the universal enabling of life-coherent
capacities through comprehensive satisfaction of life-requirements. By
arguing from the achieved level of civil commons development, and
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demonstrating how this development demands collective as opposed to
private appropriation of social wealth, socialists can refute the capitalist
critique of socialism by embracing it. All that socialists need as an effective rejoinder is to say: yes it is socialist, and look, it actually works.
Conceiving of socialism as an organic development out struggles oriented by the universal goal of comprehensive satisfaction of life requirements takes us beyond sterile debates about reform or revolution. The
real problem is not constructing an abstract proof that capitalism is or is
not reformable, but securing public control over life-sustaining and lifedeveloping resources and institutions, and using them in life-coherent
ways. The practicability of this task is proven by the existing level of
civil commons development. The task of building socialism is thus a task
of extending existing civil commons practices into the core economic
and political systems of capitalist society. To conclude I will examine
whether or not there are any existing practices which can serve as an
organic basis from which to build struggles capable of transforming
these core systems.
It is a well-known objection to capitalist democracy that it is at best
incomplete because it does not extend into economic institutions (see
for example Meiksins Wood, 1995). One of the great achievements in
the history of socialist struggle is the development of workers’ councils,
novel political institutions through which the coercive economic power
exercised by money-value and management as its servant over workers
can be overcome. In the experience of the contemporary working class in
North America and Europe there appear to be no analogues of workers
councils. Hence the demand for workers councils would sound exactly
like a demand “dropping from the sky” and be unlikely to mobilise significant numbers of people.
While there are no existing analogues of institutions like workers’
councils in contemporary Western capitalism, there is a civil commons
institution which embodies the principle of workplace democracy. That
institution is the trade union understood as a forum in which workers
debate together about how best to structure their conditions of work.
Like other civil commons institutions under capitalism unions are
imperfect expressions of the democratic principle of workers control of
production because unions presuppose management as a bargaining
opponent and the money-value system as the object of bargaining. Nevertheless, unions are an organic basis for socialist arguments in favour
of the more comprehensive democratization of work life because, when
they are functioning well, they draw workers out of self-enclosed con-
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cern for doing their job and getting paid into political debates about
how work life ought to be governed and what its universal social significance is. Without minimizing any of the challenges facing unions or the
limitations of their current mode of operation, it remains true to say, as
Hilary Wainwright recently has, that “unions are, in many countries, the
largest, the best resourced, most stable, most institutional, and in some
respects to most rooted ... movements in civil society...Unions can facilitate the organization of knowledge, practical actions, expert research,
and popular expression of the mass of people to defend social needs
and the means of meeting them” (Wainwright, 2011, p. 3). Consciously
turned in the direction of contesting the authority of management at
work and the rule of money-value over life-requirement satisfaction,
unions could function as the organic foundation for deeper struggles
for the democratization, i.e., the rule of the common life-interest within,
economic life generally.
But is not the principle of the rule of the common life-interest the
deepest justification of existing democratic institutions? The very first
value affirmed by the American Declaration of Independence, for
example, is “life.” Yet we know through observation that it is not the
value of life that actually rules, but the power of money. Nevertheless,
existing democratic institutions cannot openly reject the principle that
they are designed to allow people to govern themselves in the shared
life-interest, for to break openly with it would be to compromise the
deepest legitimating value of liberal-democratic capitalism: freedom.
Thus the political institutions of existing liberal-democratic
capitalism also provide an organic basis for the comprehensive
life-coherent democratic institutions that socialism would require.
Marx himself argued that the working class must win the battle of
democracy (Marx and Engles, 1986, p. 53; see also Nimtz, 2000).
Today I believe that struggles need to be organized around gaining
political control of existing political institutions and using them for
life-valuable ends. The age of revolutionary vanguardism and the
“Noah complex” (the belief that nothing new can be built until the
old world has been washed away) has passed (Collier, 2009, p. 98).
While certainly far from perfect, the examples of Venezuela and
Bolivia provide evidence that existing parliamentary institutions
need not be instruments of class power, but can be transformed
from institutions of class rule to institutions of genuine lifecoherent democracy. The history of revolutionary vanguardism
proves that the violent conquest of the existing ruling class does
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not at all entail success in building a life-coherent society. The construction of a life-coherent alternative does not so much depend
upon single-minded devotion to the cause—always a mindset that
carries with it profound dangers—as it does learning to distinguish
in every case between the life-value of a given institution and the
system-value that prevents the full expression of that life-value.
Radical political practice today depends not so much on the invention of new institutions as the fuller realization of the life-value of
the existing institution. In the case of existing political institutions
the life-value is that their legitimacy enables ruling parties to use
state power to implement their agenda.
If this agenda is a comprehensive program of life-coherent social
transformation, then its democratic legitimacy cannot be coherently contested by opponents. If its democratic legitimacy cannot be contested,
then the only way in which it can be attacked is for opponents to drop
all pretence to democracy and violently assert their particular interests
against the universal life-interest. In doing so they deprive themselves of
the legitimacy
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